Speculations Surrounding the Identity of Christmas Market Attacker Taleb Al Abdulmohsen

maagdenburg - Social media is abuzz with speculations about the true identity of Taleb Al Abdulmohsen, the perpetrator of the attack on the Christmas market in Maagdenburg. What should we believe?

The head of the federal police emphasized on Saturday evening: the attacker exhibited 'atypical' behavior that 'did not fit into a pattern'. Immediately after the attack, the tug-of-war between left and right began. On the left flank, there was a sense of relief that it was not a jihadist attack. An attack by a Muslim would play into the hands of far-right parties such as AfD or PVV and fuel Islamophobia.

'How delicious karma can be,' cheered VU lecturer Petra van Dam. 'Radical right-wingers and extremists immediately claimed that the attack was related to Muslim extremism and open-border policies. Now it turns out that it involves someone from their own camp and a right-wing extremist attack.'

On the right flank, there was a lot of skepticism. Some see Al Abdulmohsen as a jihadist in atheistic sheep's clothing. Some believe they hear the cry of 'Allahu akbar' in a video of the attacker's arrest. Doubters point to more clues. A doctor finds a particular Quran recitation very moving. His social media shows anti-Israel sentiment. In conclusion, for author and Arabist Arthur van Amerongen, the mass murderer of Maagdenburg is simply a crazy Muslim and an ordinary copycat.

Yet, political sociologist and extremism expert Jelle van Buuren states: 'Asking which side the man stands on is actually the wrong question. We want to quickly determine a category - far-right or a jihadist - but you can see that the ideas of this attacker are not easily defined.'

Van Buuren speaks of 'salad bar extremism' reflected in Taleb Al Abdulmohsen's online expressions. 'Someone who mixes everything together, making it hard to fit into a category A or B. On one hand, he was angry about the generous admission of refugees in Germany, and on the other hand, he was furious about the German police hindering Saudi apostates. It's a mix of everything.'

Are there examples of such hard-to-define figures in the Netherlands? Van Buuren mentions Chris T., who planned an attack on BNNVARA figure Tim Hofman and Erasmusschutter Fouad L. 'A cocktail of personal and extremist motives.'

Historian Machteld Allan criticizes the triumphalism of the left. She reprimanded a journalist who wondered if Geert Wilders had realized 'that it seems the perpetrator is a radicalized right-wing extremist'. 'Very inappropriate to say something like that the day after such an attack. A nine-year-old boy has died. The Germans are getting a lot. Hold back and investigate first.'

The discussion quickly shifts to the term 'taqiyya', a concept among Shiite Muslims allowing the concealment of beliefs in times of war or persecution. 'The oldest trick of Islam,' writes German ex-Muslim Ali Utlu. 'And it still works in 2024. Islamophobes attack Muslims, not Christians.'

Ali Utlu personally knew Al Abdulmohsen but kept his distance. 'I, like other Islam critics, considered him a Saudi agent spying on Saudi apostates and ex-Muslims. I didn't believe then, and I still don't believe now, that he is an apostate.'

Skeptics point out that Al Abdulmohsen renewed his Saudi passport in 2008 despite fleeing the country in 2006. 'The ex-Muslim story is nonsense,' writes Flemish jihad watcher Peter Velle. 'He had a hidden agenda as a jihadist.'

The jihad watcher mentions an attacker who blew himself up in Liverpool in 2021 after converting to Christianity. However, the motive was his rejected asylum application, not jihad. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that Al Abdulmohsen's open atheism was taqiyya to conceal his jihadist attack plan. The doctor showed little effort on social media to hide his willingness to resort to violence, displaying an assault rifle on his account.

Furthermore, for terrorists, violence is a means to convey a message. They often leave a statement or video testament, ensuring no doubt arises about their motives.

Van Buuren: 'People want clarity. What was he really? On the left, you see almost gloating satisfaction: 'Look, he was a fan of Wilders!' The right counteracts with the taqiyya theory. But honestly, I see too many indications that this doesn't add up. When you see what German media unearthed: this man has been anti-Islam for a long time. It could all have been one big act, but he would have had to keep it up for a very long time.'

The heated debate about 'which side' the man belongs to is resetting cognitive dissonance, according to Van Buuren: 'You understand it again, so you can go about your day relieved, fitting this story into good and bad, with yourself naturally on the right side.'

Historian Machteld Allan: 'The simple answer is: we just don't know enough yet. There are still too many loose ends to draw a conclusion.'

The question of whether Al Abdulmohsen was a 'confused man' will arise again, leading to heated emotions. Van Buuren: 'There are people on social media waiting with a stopwatch until NOS uses the term 'confused man'. But he can have terrorist motives and be confused. Perhaps he became increasingly willing to use violence due to paranoia. An expert report will need to clarify that.'

Al Abdulmohsen himself used the term 'confused'. 'The police say I'm confused and don't know what I'm saying,' he said in a video on Friday, the day of the attack. 'While I work as a doctor in a government hospital.'